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English Abstract
The polemic was an important cultural event in 19th-century Cuba. From 1838 to 1840, 
issues of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, and the influence of Victor 
Cousin’s eclecticism were discussed in the island’s  leading newspapers. A brief 
historical account preceding the polemic is  offered.  I argue that the predominant view of 
the polemic, which is  motivated by a widespread desire for Cuba’s independence from 
Spain, is  misleading in its promotion of an emancipatory myth. Lastly, I argue that José 
de la Luz y Caballero’s appeal to patriotism during the polemic unwittingly established a 
dangerous precedent for self-appointed guardians of patriotism to condition public 
debates.
Resumen en español
La polémica fue un importante evento cultural durante el siglo diecinueve en Cuba. 
Entre 1838 a 1840 se debatieron en los  principales  periódicos de la isla temas en torno 
a la metafísica, la epistemología, la ética, la pedagogía y la influencia del eclecticismo 
de Víctor Cousin.  Narro brevemente algunos de los hechos  históricos que 
antecedieron esta polémica.  Sostengo que es inexacta la interpretación predominante 
que esta polémica fue motivada por el deseo de independizar a Cuba de España. Tal 
interpretación promueve un mito de emancipación.  Según mi análisis, cuando en su 
intervención en la polémica José de la Luz y Caballero apela al patriotismo, establece 
sin saberlo un precedente peligroso que usarán los autodenominados protectores del 
patriotismo para restringir los debates públicos.
Resumo em português
A polêmica foi um importante evento cultural durante o século dezenove em Cuba. 
Entre 1838 e 1840 se debateram nos principais  jornais da ilha temas em torno da 
metafísica, a epistemologia, a ética, a pedagogia e a influência do eclecticismo de 
Víctor Cousin.  Narro brevemente alguns dos fatos históricos que antecederam esta 
polêmica.  Sustenho que é inexacta a interpretação predominante que esta polêmica foi 
motivada por o desejo de dissociar a Cuba da Espanha. Tal interpretação promove um 
mito de emancipação.  Segundo meu análise, quando em sua intervencão na polêmica 
José de la Luz y Caballero apela ao patriotismo, establece sim saber um precedente 
perigoso que usarão os autodenominados protetores do patriotismo para restringir os 
debates públicos.
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The “Philosophical Polemic in Havana” refers to a set of public debates that 
occurred in 19th-century Cuba among mostly young scholars  and men of letters. These 
debates often resulted in heated arguments and, at times, ad hominem attacks among 
disputants. As a result of their intensity, the debates have become known collectively as 
“the polemic.” 
I am arguing for two main theses. First, that the polemic, rather than being 
motivated by an emancipatory sense of patriotism seeking independence from Spain, 
was primarily, although not exclusively, motivated by philosophical and pedagogical 
concerns about the impact of modern philosophy and modern science in Cuba. Second, 
that by raising the specter of patriotism in some of the debates, José de la Luz y 
Caballero, a leading participant in the polemic, tries to condition public debate by 
attempting to disqualify the views of those whom he viewed as being insufficiently 
patriotic. In so doing, he unwittingly established a dangerous precedent for self-
appointed guardians of patriotism to condition public debates.
The polemic, which is barely known in Anglophone culture, was an important 
public display of philosophical acumen on the reception of modern philosophy in Cuba. 
From May 1838 to October 1840, issues of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, 
pedagogy, and the influence of Victor Cousin’s eclecticism in the practice of philosophy 
in Cuba were discussed in the island’s leading newspapers.[1] In the capital, Havana, 
most debates were published in Diario de la Habana, Noticioso y Lucero, and El Plantel; 
in Puerto Principe in Gaceta de Puerto Principe; in Matanzas in La Aurora de Matanzas, 
and in Trinidad in Correo de Trinidad.[2] The debates were so contentious that they 
soon reverberated to rural places, such as the villa of Santísima Trinidad, where a 
controversy ensued about establishing a teaching position in philosophy and choosing a 
suitable text for it.[3]
The polemic consists of about one hundred seventy-five mainly newspaper 
articles, some of which are substantive in length. In addition, the polemic culminated 
with José de la Luz y Caballero’s unfinished essay, “Impugnación a las Doctrinas 
Filosóficas de Victor Cousin” [Impugnation to Victor Cousin’s  Philosophical Doctrines], 
which is about one hundred thirty pages long.[4] As one scholar underscores, the 
polemic shows a rather conspicuous interest of the educated public in the island that for 
two years sustained an atypical interest in these debates.[5]
By following the above-mentioned debates, the educated public was kept abreast 
of innovative developments  in European philosophy, especially in Francophone 
philosophy, whose leading exponent in Cuba was  Victor Cousin. Thus, Cousin’s 
eclecticism imbued most of the important arguments animating the polemic. 
Victor Cousin (1792-1867) was an influential French philosopher at the École 
Normale in Paris who expounded studies in the history of philosophy, philosophy of 
history, and German idealism. In addition, he acquired an international reputation for 
translating Proclus’s and Plato’s  works  and editing the works of Descartes. As an 
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appointed minister of public instruction in 1840, during the July Monarchy, he advocated 
secularism and nonsectarianism as a way of reforming primary and secondary 
education to promote national unity.[6]
Cousin was also known for his modern conception of eclecticism. Like classical 
eclecticism, his modern eclecticism was, to a large extent, a reaction against the 
scholastic appeal to magister dixit. He borrowed ideas from different philosophical 
systems and, hence, learned from different philosophers to try to create his own system.
[7] He also urged reconciliation of opposites not only in philosophy but also in politics. 
That is, he tried to accomplish the juste-milieu or golden mean in philosophy and 
politics.[8]
Trying to accomplish the juste-milieu in France during the July Monarchy might 
have been commendable, but trying to do the same in Cuba during the 1830s would 
have been considered seditious. Since 1825, the captain general of Cuba appointed by 
Spain was granted “facultades omnímodas” or despotic power.[9] Henceforth, the island 
was virtually under martial law for the next fifty years. So for Luz y Caballero, the 
exercise of such despotic power that privileges the Spanish oligarchy in the island over 
the white Creole elite was a humiliating experience.
That might partly explain Luz y Caballero’s concern about Cousin’s influence on 
the Cuban youth. He worried that those who have been influenced by Cousin’s 
eclecticism in philosophy might adopt the same spirit of reconciliation in politics 
becoming acquiescent to, rather than critical of, the prevalent Spanish despotism and 
the widespread practice of slavery.[10]
 
Contrary to Luz y Caballero’s  concerns about the detrimental effects of Cousin’s 
eclecticism, some prominent South American scholars, such as Andrés Bello and Juan 
Bautista Alberdi, welcomed it as a way of combating the old scholasticism in support of 
modern philosophy and modern science. Bello was a leading 19th-century Venezuelan 
polymath  as well as a prestigious pedagogue, philosopher, and diplomat.[11] Alberdi 
was a prominent 19th-century Argentine political philosopher and diplomat.[12] In 
addition to Bello and Alberdi, other reputable Latin American philosophers and scholars 
also embraced Cousin’s eclecticism.[13] So it seems that, depending on contextual 
considerations, Cousin’s eclecticism was thought either to be helpful for transforming or 
preserving the status quo. 
In Cuba, José de la Luz y Caballero (1800-1862) impugned Cousin’s eclecticism 
on philosophical and political grounds. Echoing Hegel’s criticism of eclecticism, Luz y 
Caballero argued that Cousin’s  eclecticism is just incoherent because Cousin tried to 
reconcile that which is irreconcilable, such as materialism and idealism. In addition, he 
alleged that Cousin’s eclecticism is just politics camouflaged as philosophy because, 
presumably, it countenances rather than criticizes the status quo. 
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I can adduce several reasons for this  project. First, the polemic is an important 
philosophical and, hence, cultural event in Cuba that has  been virtually ignored in 
Anglophone philosophy. Second, the polemic has been misconstrued by scholars on the 
right and the left as having been motivated by a widespread Cuban desire for 
independence from Spain.
 
Third, the attempts by some of the leading participants in the polemic, especially 
José de la Luz y Caballero, occasionally to  justify their philosophical arguments by 
appealing to patriotism or argumentum ad amorem patriae can be interpreted as a 
prototype of the fallacy of appeal to the people or argumentum ad populum. Such an 
appeal can also be interpreted as a tacit ad hominem argument, whereby the intentions 
of those who are viewed as insufficiently patriotic are suspect. 
And fourth, the appeal to the patriotism fallacy has been and still is being used to 
curtail the freedom of philosophical speculation and political freedoms in countries 
around the world. Hence, exploring the polemic in Cuba is not just an exotic 
philosophical exercise, or a futile logomachy, but one that might have practical 
implications by alerting people to be vigilant and critical about similar restrictions in the 
practice of professional philosophy and enjoyment of political freedoms elsewhere.
I explore the importance of this project in four parts. In the first part, I present a 
brief historical exposition for understanding some of the issues leading to the polemic. I 
underscore the pivotal role that José Agustín Caballero (1762-1835), uncle of Luz y 
Caballero, played in reforming the teaching and practice of philosophy in Cuba at the 
end of the 18th Century and the early part of the 19th Century. Yet Félix Varela y 
Morales (1788-1853), a former student of Caballero, challenged the scholasticism 
taught at the Royal and Pontifical University of Saint Jerome of Havana founded in 1728 
(henceforth, University of Havana). The historical exposition will show that early 
arguments on the impact of modern philosophy in Cuba were mainly disagreements 
about the nature of philosophy, the role of theology in philosophical argumentation, and 
the attempt to overcome scholasticism in favor of modern philosophy and modern 
science. 
In the second part, I explore fundamentally contested issues animating the 
polemic: on methodology, morality, and Cousin’s eclecticism. None of the issues 
debated focused on patriotism per se. Sometimes, however, Luz y Caballero appeals to 
patriotism to try to disqualify his opponents. I argue that such appeals are fallacious by 
allowing concerns about patriotism to eclipse substantive philosophical arguments.
  
In the third part, I argue that the predominant view of the polemic as motivated by 
a widespread Cuban desire for independence from Spain promotes an emancipatory 
myth. Such a predominant view of the polemic is anachronistic and hence one-sided, 
consisting either in a straw man fallacy or a false dilemma. Lastly, I argue that Luz y 
Caballero’s appeal to patriotism during the polemic unwittingly provided a dangerous 
precedent for self-appointed guardians of patriotism to condition public debates.
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I Historical Background
The polemic transpired at a time of intellectual curiosity and animadversions 
regarding Spain’s role in the island’s affairs. This  was also a time of political oppression. 
The captain general appointed by Spain had enjoyed despotic power in Cuba. Such 
despotic power was used intermittently depending on the perceived or real threat of 
sedition by groups disaffected with Spain’s  policies towards its colony, especially 
members of the white Creole elites, free people of color, and slaves  who repudiated the 
perpetuation and expansion of slavery.[14]
Prior to 1825, Juan José Días de Espada y Fernández de Landa (1756-1832), 
who was appointed Bishop of Havana in 1802, had welcomed the teaching of modern 
philosophy and modern science at the San Carlos and San Ambrosio Seminary 
(henceforth, San Carlos  Seminary).[15] Nonetheless, the priest José Agustín Caballero, 
in his  Philosophia Electiva (1797), circumspectly introduced modern philosophy and 
modern science into the curriculum of the University of Havana and the San Carlos 
Seminary where he taught theology and philosophy.[16]
Caballero’s Philosophia Electiva retains the preeminence of theology over 
philosophy. So he cautiously engaged the works of modern philosophers such as 
Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche. As Mestre indicates, Caballero expounded 
Descartes’ philosophical ideas, whose name was barely known in Cuba at that time.[17]
 
 Another diocesan priest, namely Félix Varela y Morales, truly reformed the 
teaching of philosophy and natural sciences in Cuba in the light of modern philosophy 
and modern science.[18] As a student of Caballero, Varela was exposed to Caballero’s 
timid incursions into modern philosophy and modern science in the San Carlos 
Seminary. Under Bishop Espada, the seminary, unlike the University of Havana, 
became a bastion for promoting modern ideas. Thus, Bishop Espada encouraged 
Varela to transcend futile, scholastic disputes. 
Varela attempted to overcome the dogmatism of scholasticism in his  first 
philosophical work, Propositiones varie ad tironum exercitationem (1812). In it, he 
embraced classical eclecticism to combat the appeal to magister dixit, which had been 
commonly used in scholastic disputations, especially regarding the authority of Aristotle. 
He argued that eclectic philosophy can learn from any school, provided the arguments 
and ideas are compatible with sound reason and experience.[19] Nevertheless, he 
dismissed scholasticism without undermining the value of Aquinas’s philosophy.[20]
Varela was  rather critical of Aristotle. He described Aristotle’s widespread 
influence at the time as  “a species of philosophical dictatorship.”[21] He believed that 
Aristotle’s glory and fame might be partly explained by the great conquests of his 
disciple Alexander the Great.[22]
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By critically engaging modern philosophers, such as Bacon, Descartes, Locke, 
Newton, and Kant, Varela transcended the stagnant scholasticism that prevailed in 
Cuba, especially in the University of Havana. So he promoted the secularization and the 
autonomy of philosophy from the shackles of theology without abandoning his Catholic 
faith. In his “Elenco de 1816” [1816 Lecture Notes], he argued, “The Patristic Fathers 
have no authority whatsoever in philosophical matters; such matters ought to be solely 
dealt with by focusing on the reasons that support them.”[23]
In 1812, Varela had already contended that, with the new developments in 
science, Galileo, Bacon, and the Spanish doctor Antonio Gómez Pereira attempted to 
overcome the “Aristotelian yoke” by establishing a genuine philosophical approach. He 
acknowledged that such a great honor belonged to Descartes who, according to him, 
relentlessly fought the Aristotelian acolytes. He went on to praise Isaac Newton as the 
father of modern physics and as the first among all those who tried to explain Nature.
[24]
II The Polemic
Varela’s and Cousin’s philosophical views prompted the polemic among 
enlightened liberal members of the Cuban intelligentsia and men of letters.[25] As 
professors in the University of Havana, Manuel González del Valle (1802-1884) and 
especially his younger brother José Zacarías González del Valle (1820-1851), who 
translated one of Cousin’s works into Spanish, were respected scholars who defended 
Cousin’s eclecticism.[26] But since Luz y Caballero and Manuel González del Valle had 
been Varela’s  students in the San Carlos Seminary, Varela’s  philosophical ideas were 
also lurking in the background of the polemic.[27]
In an 1840 letter to a former student who had inquired about his views on the 
polemic, Varela wrote, “ [T]he points  of the controversy are three: First, whether the 
teaching of Philosophy should begin with Physics or with Logic; second, whether utility 
should be admitted as a principle and standard of action; third, whether the Cousin 
system should be admitted.”[28] Therefore, the bulk of the polemic is about challenging 
philosophical issues regarding methodology, morality and gauging Cousin’s eclecticism 
rather than issues about emancipatory patriotism, as some scholars contend, whom I 
discuss in the third section of my paper. Hence, in this section, I address the 
philosophical issues first, and in  later sections I address issues regarding patriotism. 
A. Methodology
By advocating teaching the natural sciences first, especially physics, rather than 
first teaching logic, psychology, and morality, as it was customarily done in the 
scholastic tradition, Luz y Caballero contributed to the polemic. He wrote, “I propose 
that the philosophy course begins with physics and concludes with the study of logic 
and morality, which is  precisely the opposite of how it is taught nowadays, and how it 
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has always been taught.”[29] Issues of methodology, however, had been debated for 
quite some time between Luz y Caballero and his  critics. In 1835, as director of the 
College of San Cristobal (a.k.a College of Carraguao) in Havana, he had already 
argued in favor of the explanatory method, which is based on induction, against the 
formal method based on mathematics and pure memorization.[30]
Having been impressed by Bacon’s inductive method and Locke’s empiricism, 
Luz y Caballero assumed that exposing students to a method of observation and 
inductive generalizations would prepare them to acquire true knowledge. Thus, he 
assumed the truth of some controversial claims. For example, he believed that from a 
chain of specific observations, students would acquire general causal knowledge about 
their specific experiences. Moreover, he presupposed, “ [I]n natural sciences we go from 
the facts to the theory.”[31] It is  puzzling that, despite being familiar with Hume’s 
philosophical ideas, he simply ignored Hume’s challenging views on induction.[32]
In his passion for overcoming scholasticism and the dangers that he perceived in 
Cousin’s eclecticism, Luz y Caballero was exuberant about the inductive or scientific 
method. Manuel Castellanos  Mojarrieta, who was a lawyer and secretary of Puerto 
Príncipe Town Hall in eastern Cuba, argued against Luz y Caballero’s pedagogical shift. 
Castellanos supported that logic continue to be taught first as a way of understanding 
our particular observations in physics and the natural sciences. For him, to have a good 
understanding of physics, we first need to have a solid understanding of sound 
reasoning, which is provided by deductive logic.[33]
In his  rejoinder to Castellanos, Luz y Caballero contended that the development 
of modern science, including chemistry, anatomy, and geology, resulted from applying 
the scientific method. The same is not true about what he referred to as the intellectual 
sciences, which included  philosophy, logic, psychology, and morality. According to him, 
the scientific method had been so successful that modern psychologists tried to 
implement it even in the intellectual sciences.[34]
Luz y Caballero preferred inductive over deductive reasoning because Francis 
Bacon’s defense of induction initiated a modern revolution in the natural sciences.[35] In 
the spirit of Varela’s eclecticism, who had already argued against the scholastic practice 
of appealing to magister dixit, Luz y Caballero ended his reply to Castellanos  by 
defending the power of reason over the power of authority. He wrote, “We owe respect 
to our teachers rather than blind faith.”[36] Yet Castellanos did not seem to be 
advocating “blind faith” to anyone. He simply disagreed with Luz y Caballero’s 
pedagogical approach. 
B. Morality
The arguments between Manuel González del Valle, a professor in the University 
of Havana, and the priest Francisco Ruiz, a professor at the San Carlos Seminary, show 
that the polemic veered to a debate on the nature of morality. While Valle defended a 
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conception of morality based on acting according to the principle of duty for duty’s  sake, 
Ruiz defended the principle of utility. 
Luz y Caballero attempted to mediate between these two polemicists because he 
esteemed them both. He, however, favored Ruiz’s utilitarianism. Valle appreciated the 
role that the principle of utility plays for improving people’s well-being, especially in the 
economic realm. However, contrary to the principle of utility, he argued that the principle 
of deontological justice supervene upon all realms of life based on people’s intentions.
[37]
Ruiz highlighted that he was using the term ‘utility’ as it was understood by 
Socrates and Cicero. He quoted with approval the following passage from Cicero’s 
work: “whatever is honorable is  beneficial.”[38] So he challenged Valle to explain how 
the principle of duty could determine the nature of our moral actions. For Ruiz, 
discharging our duties must contribute to people’s happiness. If so, he continued, the 
principle of duty would necessarily be beneficial. Hence, according to Ruiz, the principle 
of duty depends upon the principle of utility.[39] Furthermore, he argued that there is no 
real distinction between justice and utility, as Valle presupposed. He maintained, “ [J]
ustice far from being different from utility constitutes, on the contrary, the supreme utility 
because in its  applications it can provide to society and thereby to its members the 
greatest happiness.”[40]
José Zacarías González del Valle, who intervened on behalf of his brother 
Manuel’s deontological view, highlighted Ruiz’s conflation of the right and the good. 
José wrote, “The language of all nations contains the terms goodness and utility, justice 
and interest, without successfully reducing them to one.”[41]
Since Valle cited parts  of Luz y Caballero’s “Elenco de Carraguao de 
1835” [Lectures of Carraguao from 1835], where he criticized the principle of utility, Luz 
y Caballero tried to explain his seemingly incoherent position regarding this principle. 
He argued that, if correctly understood, Ruiz’s  and Valle’s positions are consistent. 
Therefore, he contended that the principle of utility and the principle of duty are 
reconcilable.
Luz y Caballero argued against Valle’s deontological view because the latter 
provided an intuitionist defense of the principle of duty. He presupposed that an 
intuitionist defense of the principle of duty committed Valle to the notion of innate ideas. 
He, however, found the notion of innate ideas unilluminating.
Luz y Caballero offered a distinctive understanding of the term ‘utility.’ He wrote, 
“[U]seful is a railroad train but more useful is justice. The term useful is applicable to 
anything that we can benefit from whether physically or morally. And if we restrict its use 
to that which is moral, it is  ascribable to generous or malicious actions.”[42] He and Ruiz 
defined the term ‘utility’ so broadly that it includes the principle of duty. Consequently, 
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they seemingly commingled two different moral principles that at times pull in different 
directions. 
C. Eclecticism
Next, the polemic focused on Victor Cousin’s  eclecticism. For Cousin, eclecticism 
neither completely rejects nor completely accepts any philosophical system; it simply 
selects from any philosophical system that which seems to be true and good.[43] He 
supports the liberty of philosophizing, which is a foundational principle of ancient and 
modern eclecticism.[44]
 
Eclecticism, Cousin argued, “[W]as born the moment that a sound head and 
feeling heart undertook to reconcile two passionate adversaries.”[45] So his eclecticism 
is  based on toleration.[46] But Cousin goes beyond the principle of toleration in 
philosophy. He argues for the reconciliation of contraries in philosophy, such as  idealism 
and empiricism, and theism and pantheism.[47]
Jules Simon, one of Cousin’s leading disciples, argued that while modern 
eclectics do not admit it, they cannot avoid the charge of syncretism.[48] Similarly, while 
never mentioning Cousin’s eclecticism by name, Hegel, who praised him for his 
translations of Proclus’s  and Plato’s works, found eclecticism “something to be utterly 
condemned” as a hodgepodge of incoherence.[49] Hence, some of Cousin’s 
contemporary counterparts realized that his eclecticism was philosophically shallow, 
although not necessarily politically dangerous, as Luz y Caballero alleged.
 
The zenith of the polemic was Luz y Caballero’s arguments against Cousin’s 
eclecticism in his  essay, “Impugnación a las Doctrinas  Filosóficas de Victor Cousin.” His 
motivation in challenging Cousin’s eclecticism was a feeling of patriotism on behalf of 
the Cuban youth. He intended to alert the Cuban youth about the detrimental effects 
that Cousin’s eclecticism could inflict on their fresh minds by persuading them to steer 
away from the study of physiology and the scientific method as  a way of improving 
people’s lives.[50]
Luz y Caballero offered a two-pronged attack against Cousin’s eclecticism. First, 
he argued that by trying to reconcile that which is philosophically incongruous, such as 
materialism and idealism, Cousin’s eclecticism was incoherent. And second, he alleged 
that Cousin’s  eclecticism is  “politics masked as  philosophy, nothing more than that.”[51] 
By this cryptic metaphorical expression, he probably meant that Cousin used his 
eclecticism to defend the status quo in France during the July Monarchy. 
As I have already-mentioned, serious  reservations arose, even among Cousin’s 
former disciples, about the coherence of his  eclecticism. Moreover, one can grant to Luz 
y Caballero that Cousin indeed used his  eclecticism to support France’s July Monarchy. 
One can even grant him that as  a minister of public instruction during 1840, Cousin 
promoted his eclecticism. Perhaps it is even fitting to call him “official philosopher of the 
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July Monarchy.”[52] Cousin is the first to admit that his  eclecticism and his politics are 
congruent.[53] Yet they are also different. 
Cousin’s eclecticism was first and foremost philosophical. His philosophical 
works prior to the July Monarchy attest to it. Prior to 1830, Cousin had already 
published some of his important philosophical works  where he developed his 
eclecticism, such as Philosophie sensualiste au XVIII siècle (1819); Fragments 
philosophiques (1826); and Cours de l’ histoire de la philosophie (1829). Hence, Luz y 
Caballero’s allegation that Cousin’s eclecticism was “politics masked as  philosophy” 
seems overstated. 
Nevertheless, Luz y Caballero’s concerns about Cousin’s eclecticism were partly 
justified. As in philosophy, reconciliation in politics is possible among those who share 
consistent rather than inconsistent beliefs and principles.[54] Moreover, Cousin’s 
eclectic spirit in politics during the 1830s liberal constitutional monarchy in France could 
be seen as a virtue because with it, Cousin tryied to transcend the vicious partisan 
politics. However, a similarly inspired eclectic spirit in Cuba’s politics—where the odious 
practice of slavery was  still rampant during 1830s and the captain general appointed by 
Spain enforced a ruthless despotism—could be seen as sanctioning a vicious society.
[55]
Still, Luz y Caballero’s concern about the enervating effect that Cousin’s 
eclecticism could have exerted on the Cuban youth seems unpersuasive. One could 
conjecture that by persuading the Cuban youth to tolerate rather than to try to overcome 
the prevalent despotism and the widespread practice of slavery, those who embraced 
Cousin’s eclecticism might have helped to prolong an unjust state of affairs in the island. 
Nevertheless, this  would be a questionable conjecture because Cousin was rather 
critical of despotism and slavery.[56]
Cousin was consistently clear on the following two points — he defended the 
autonomy of philosophy and individual liberty. Simon, who was rather critical of Cousin’s 
eclecticism and of his politics, acknowledged this: “Upon these two points he [Cousin] 
would not yield, and never did yield.”[57]
Some contemporary scholars acknowledge as much. For example, Alan Spitzer 
states that Cousin’s commitment “to a completely unfettered exploration of fundamental 
questions implied the strong possibility of unacceptable conclusions.”[58] Such 
“unacceptable conclusions” could challenge the powers that be whether philosophical, 
political, or otherwise. By insisting on an instrumental use of philosophy, and by his 
occasional appeal to patriotism, Luz y Caballero inadvertently inspired an emancipatory 
myth, namely that the polemic was primarily motivated by an emancipatory sense of 
patriotism seeking independence from Spain.
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III Emancipatory Myth
 Politically conservative scholars, such as the late Humberto Piñera, who was a 
respected 20th Century Cuban philosopher,  progressive scholars, such as the late 
Leopoldo Zea, who was an influential 20th Century Mexican philosopher and historian 
of Latin American ideas,  and Neo-Marxist scholars, such as Alicia Conde and Eduardo 
Torres-Cuevas, who are contemporary Cuban historians, converge on promoting an 
emancipatory myth. For them, the philosophical polemic is a watershed in the formation 
of Cuban national consciousness leading to Cuba’s independence from Spain. 
Piñera writes, “In this polemic, one finds an important part of our history and the 
hidden seed for the process of Cuban independence.” Moreover, he refers to this event 
as a “cultural process that internally hides a political question.”[59] Similarly, Zea states, 
“Luz y Caballero had entered the polemic for patriotic reasons.”[60]
Conde, like Torres-Cuevas, couches the polemic as a false dilemma. Those who 
conceived of modern philosophy in the tradition of Varela and Luz y Caballero were 
patriots helping to forge Cuban national identity. Therefore, they laid the foundation for 
Cuba’s independence from Spain. By contrast, those who conceived of modern 
philosophy in the tradition of Cousin’s eclecticism, such as the brothers  González del 
Valle, helped to preserve the status quo. Therefore, they helped to maintain strong ties 
with Spain.[61]
Moreover, Conde and Torres-Cuevas  assume that those who embraced Cousin’s 
eclecticism, unlike Varela and Luz y Caballero, were defending their class interest as 
members of a bourgeois slaveholding oligarchy.[62] Though Luz y Caballero was also a 
member of such bourgeois slaveholding oligarchy, he opposed Spanish despotism and 
slavery.[63] So did the brothers González del Valle too, who as members of the liberal 
group spearheaded by Domingo del Monte, were critical of Spanish despotism. They 
were also against the slave trade and favored gradual abolition of slavery.[64] Like the 
brothers González del Valle, Luz y Caballero never advocated independence from 
Spain as a way of ending Spanish despotism.[65] Nor did he ever propose a plan on 
how to abolish slavery in the island.
In the polemic, except for the long citation of Varela’s disquisition on patriotism 
excerpted from his Miscelánea Filosófica by one of Luz y Caballero’s opponents,  only 
scarce references to patriotism appear. Luz y Caballero used the term ‘patriotism’ four 
times without actually defining or explaining it.[66]
 
The contenders  seem to have been motivated by multifaceted considerations. 
But they seem to have been motivated primarily by philosophical and pedagogical 
reasons, and only secondarily by literary and/or political concerns  understood in a broad 
sense. If that is so, then Piñera’s, Zea’s, Conde’s, and Torres-Cuevas’s interpretation of 
the polemic as having been motivated by patriotism conceived as a widespread Cuban 
desire for emancipation from Spain risks being anachronistic and hence one-sided. 
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They seem to be reading back into a 19th-century debate their own 20th-century beliefs 
about it. 
The few scattered references to patriotism by some of the contenders in the 
polemic, especially by Luz y Caballero, demonstrate a concern for the commonweal of 
the nation or patriotism in a generic sense. That is rather different from Piñera’s, Zea’s, 
Conde’s, and Torres-Cuevas’ interpretation that the polemic was motivated by an 
emancipatory patriotism seeking independence from Spain.
No evidence exists, in the polemic or in any of the oeuvres of Luz y Caballero’s 
inklings, that suggests Luz y Caballero’s favor toward emancipatory patriotism. Yet 
some of his critics from Spain assumed that he championed emancipatory patriotism 
because some of his  formers students joined in the 1868 nationwide struggle of Cuba’s 
independence from Spain.[67] Ironically, some of his sympathizers  had assumed 
likewise.[68] Still, such an assumption is unwarranted. 
In one of his few political remarks about Cuba’s independence, Luz y Caballero 
had warned about how dangerous independence from Spain could be.[69] In the 
absence of any reliable textual and/or oral evidence supporting the above-mentioned 
assumption, the assumption seems spurious. Hence, one can reasonably assume that 
Luz y Caballero embraced generic rather than emancipatory patriotism.[70]
 
The contenders in the polemic engaged in disputations none of which address 
issues of patriotism. Both camps engaged in the polemic welcomed modern philosophy, 
but disagreed on which version of it should be adopted. Those who embraced the 
Cartesian cogito, Cousin’s  modern eclecticism, and deontology were more sympathetic 
to Neo-Scholasticism than those who adopted Bacon’s induction, Locke’s empiricism, 
and Bentham’s utilitarianism. This is so because they, like Cousin, were open to the 
possibility of ontological conjectures about the existence and attributes of God 
independently of empirical considerations. 
The prevalent emancipatory myth of the polemic seems one-sided consisting 
either in a straw man fallacy or in a false dilemma.  This mythcan be seen as a straw 
man fallacy because there were motley philosophical controversies none of which was 
on patriotism per se. The myth can also be seen as a false dilemma because there are 
better explanations  of the polemic based on reliable textual evidence. For example, in 
his brief but interesting 1862 book on philosophy in Havana, José Manuel Mestre, who 
was critical of Cousin’s eclecticism, revisited the polemic. His assessment of the 
polemic is  congruent with Varela’s assessment of it back in 1840. For Mestre, like for 
Varela, the philosophical debates during the polemic were primarily about the nature of 
philosophy, such as  the debate on the role of logic, morality, and Cousin’s  eclecticism.
[71]
During the polemic, Luz y Caballero deflected attention from legitimate 
philosophical arguments by appealing to patriotism. In doing so, he tried to disqualify his 
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opponents’ arguments by tacitly questioning their motives. In the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary, assuming that all participants in the polemic thought of 
themselves as bona fide patriots  in the generic sense, especially the brothers  González 
del Valle, who publicly acknowledged sincere respect for Varela and for Luz y Caballero, 
is reasonable. 
 Like Luz y Caballero, the brothers González del Valle genuinely loved their 
country and were working for the improvement of their compatriots  according to their 
own conception of the good. Thus, the implicit disagreement between Luz y Caballero’s 
and their conception of the good for Cuban society can be portrayed as a reasonable 
disagreement among people of good faith. Their explicit disagreements, however, were 
about how best to practice and teach philosophy in Cuba. 
IV Conclusion
I have shown that the early arguments prior to the Philosophical Polemic in 
Havana were mainly disagreements about the nature of philosophy, the role of theology 
in philosophical argumentation, and the overcoming of scholasticism in favor of modern 
philosophy and modern science. The newly generated arguments  by the polemic are 
primarily about methodology, morality, and the philosophical import of Victor Cousin’s 
eclecticism. Hence, none of the newly generated arguments is about patriotism per se. 
Thus, Luz y Caballero’s occasional appeal to patriotism in trying to justify his 
philosophical disquisitions, and thereby disqualify his opponents’ views, was based on a 
fallacious argumentum ad populum and/or a tacit ad hominem argument. 
I have argued that the predominant view of the polemic, which has been 
understood to be motivated by a widespread Cuban desire for independence from 
Spain, misleadingly promotes an emancipatory myth. Such a view of the polemic is 
anachronistic and hence one-sided, consisting either in a straw man fallacy or a false 
dilemma.
I have also argued that Luz y Caballero’s allegation that Cousin’s  eclecticism is 
just politics camouflaged as philosophy seems overstated. Regardless of the 
shortcomings of Cousin’s  eclecticism, his liberal principle of toleration in philosophy and 
politics  and his  arguments supporting the autonomy of philosophy have helped to 
establish a legacy respecting the unrestricted liberty and practice of professional 
philosophy.[72]
Despite Luz y Caballero’s Herculean efforts on behalf of the liberty of teaching 
modern philosophy and modern science in Cuba, his appeal to patriotism during the 
polemic has paradoxically established a dangerous precedent. Henceforth, defenders  of 
political expediency could try to justify and/or excuse acting under the aegis of 
patriotism to restrict the scope of public debates. 
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A frequently quoted expression by Luz y Caballero illustrates the risk of the 
above-mentioned threat. He wrote, “A philosopher, being tolerant, is cosmopolitan, but 
he ought to be, above all, patriotic.”[73] He seemed oblivious to a real tension that 
existed between the practice of toleration in philosophy and politics and his cri de coeur 
to patriotism. Should those who are unpatriotic be tolerated? If so, to what extent should 
they be tolerated? Most importantly, who has the right to decide who is a genuine patriot 
and who is not? Luz y Caballero’s silence on these challenging questions is ominous.
To sum up, Luz y Caballero’s occasional appeal to patriotism to try to rebut his 
opponents’ arguments  unwittingly provided a dangerous precedent for self-appointed 
guardians of patriotism to condition public debates. Perhaps such conditioning has been 
and still is a regrettable common practice in different parts of the globe. However, once 
we allow for people appealing to patriotism rather than to reason and argumentation to 
try to settle philosophical debates, we are essentially sanctioning the tyranny of politics 
over reason. We might be unable to prevent such tyranny. Nevertheless, we can always 
be vigilant and critical about those who try to restrict the practice of professional 
philosophy and enjoyment of political freedoms anywhere in the world.
Vicente Medina
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